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OPSOMMING
Die verlede, hede en toekoms van middelike aanspreeklikheid in   
Suid-Afrika
Die onlangse – en volgens sommige, onrusbarende – tendens in Suid-Afrika
om werkgewers (veral die staat) aanspreeklik te hou vir die onregmatige,
skuldige dade van hulle werknemers gee aanleiding tot probleme en enige
ondersoek na die moontlike middellike aanspreeklikheid van die werkgewer
moet noodwendig altyd begin met die vraag of die werknemer wel ’n delik
gepleeg het. Waar daar nie ’n delik is nie, is daar nie sprake van direkte of
middellike aanspreeklikheid nie. Dit is belangrik om vas te stel wat die
verhouding tussen die delikspleger en sy werkgewer was waar dit vasstaan
dat die werknemer wel ’n delik gepleeg het. Dit is dan juis by die vasstelling
of die werknemer in die loop van sy diens gehandel het dat beleids-
oorwegings na vore kom. Suid-Afrikaanse howe het oor die jare toetse
geformuleer om vas te stel of ’n werknemer in die loop van sy diens
gehandel het of nie. Die doel van hierdie artikel is om die probleem van
middellike aanspreeklikheid onder die loep te neem. Eisers probeer altyd in
die diepste sakke grawe – diè van werkgewers – en hierdie tendens sal
waarskynlik voortgesit word. Hierdie artikel streef om ’n nuwe perspektief op
middellike aanspreeklikheid te gee en begin deur ’n kort historiese oorsig van
hierdie vorm van skuldlose aanspreeklikheid in Suid-Afrika. Die artikel
bespreek ook ’n aantal spesifieke probleme, waarvan die dilemma
aangaande werknemers wat op diens is of nie en die ingewikkelde vraag
rondom diensbestek die eerste is. Die artikel ondersoek ook die Wet op
Arbeidsverhoudinge soos wat dit op wangedrag van toepassing is en die aard
van die verhouding tussen werkgewer en werknemer. Direkte aanspreek-
likheid as ’n alternatiewe eisoorsaak teen werkgewers onder sekere
omstandighede word spesifiek gemeld.
1 Introduction
Ellen Sturgis Hooper wrote:
I slept, and dreamed that life was beauty;
I woke, and found that life was duty.1
Sturgis Hooper’s words epitomise that which is arguably the defining
aspect of daily life, namely, duty. Formal duty, in the form of
1 Beauty and Duty (1840).
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226    2012 De Jureemployment, often defines an individual. It is not uncommon to refer to
someone as “Bob the builder” or to introduce a friend by saying: “Pearl’s
a singer.”2 This close association between an individual’s name and his
or her occupation is indicative of society’s expectations that people will
generally act in accordance with their duties, training and expertise. It is
perhaps not surprising then that the rape victim in F v Minister of Safety
and Security3 expected the police officer who was on stand-by duty to
take her home and not to harm her. Surely one may expect a police
officer to behave like a police officer? 
However, if expecting someone to act according to what we deem to
be his or her “duty” was that straightforward, we would not be writing
this article. The recent – and some say alarming – trend in South Africa
to hold employers (particularly the government) liable for wrongful,
culpable acts committed by their employees gives rise to difficulties and
any inquiry into the possible vicarious liability of the employer should
necessarily always start by asking whether there was in fact a wrongful,
culpable act committed by the employee.4 If not, there can neither be
direct liability of the employee nor vicarious liability by the employer.
Where the employee did indeed commit a delict, the relationship
between the wrongdoer and his employer at the time of the wrongdoing
becomes important.5 It is then often, in determining whether the
employee was acting in the scope of his employment, that normative
issues come to the fore. Over the years South African courts have devised
tests to determine whether an employee was in fact acting in the scope
of his employment.6 
The purpose of the article is to delve a bit deeper into the issue of
vicarious liability. Plaintiffs always seek to dig into the deepest pockets –
that of an employer – and this trend is likely to continue.7 The article
seeks to contrast vicarious liability with direct liability and sets out to
sketch a brief historical overview of this form of strict liability in South
Africa. It discusses the case of F as an example of an extreme situation
in which vicarious liability arose.
In addition, the article discusses a number of specific issues, first of
which is the dilemma around on- and off-duty employees and the
problematic issue of “scope of employment”. The article examines the
Labour Relations Act8 as it applies to misconduct and the nature of the
2 Written by Leibner et al and performed by Elkie Brooks, “Pearl’s a singer”
tells the tale of a performer who “sings songs for the lost and the lonely”. We
are also told that “her job is entertaining folks, singing songs and telling
jokes, in a nightclub.” Accessed from http://www.lyrics.com/pearls-a-singer-
lyrics-elkie-brooks.html on 2012-03-13.
3 [2011] ZACC 37.
4 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Delict (2010) 365.
5 Neethling et al 366-368.
6 Neethling et al 368-371.
7 Potgieter “Preliminary Thoughts on Whether Vicarious Liability Should be
Extended to the Parent-Child Relationship” 2011 Obiter 189 191.
8 66 of 1995.
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liability is compared to other forms of strict liability such as that
introduced by the Consumer Protection Act.9 Finally, the article deals in
some detail with Froneman J’s judgment in F that argues that the direct
– and not strict liability – of an employer may in some instances form the
basis of a delictual claim against that employer.
2 Vicarious and Other Forms of Liability
Vicarious liability may in general terms be defined as “the strict liability
of one person for the delict of another”.10 Initially foreign to South
African law, vicarious liability had been borrowed from English law.11
Many theories attempt to explain the rationale and basis of vicarious
liability, such as the employer’s fault in selecting the employee, the
interest and profit theory, the solvency theory, and the risk or danger
theory, to mention a few.12 Regardless of the basis of vicarious liability,
it is now well established that one person can be vicariously liable for the
damage caused by another.13 This type of liability is an exception to the
“basic premise of the law of delict that fault is a prerequisite for
liability”.14 Remember, according to the fault theory the wrongdoer had
to act with fault, either intent or negligence, in order to incur delictual
liability,15 whereas strict liability is liability in the absence of fault.
Recognised instances of strict liability are rare and stem mainly from
modern legislation (such as the Consumer Protection Act)16 or common
law actions of Roman origin.17 Already before the enactment of the
Consumer Protection Act18 writers argued in favour of strict product
liability. In the words of Van der Walt:
9 68 of 2008.
10 Neethling et al 365 (authors’ emphasis).
11 Ibid; Calitz “Vicarious Liability of Employers: Reconsidering Risk as the Basis
for Liability” 2005 TSAR 215 217; Grobler v Naspers Bpk 2004 4 SA 220 (C)
277E-F.
12 For a detailed discussion, see Potgieter 2011 Obiter 189 191-192. See also
Neethling et al 365-366.
13 Neethling et al 365.
14 Potgieter 2011 Obiter 189.
15 Neethling et al 329.
16 Botha & Joubert “Does the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 provide for
Strict Liability? – A Comparative Analysis” 2011 THRHR 305 305-319.
17 Van der Walt & Midgley Principles of delict (2005) par 28. 
18 In terms of s 61 Consumer Protection Act, a producer, importer, distributor
or retailer of goods will be liable for defective products. These categories of
persons are liable jointly and severally. They are also liable wholly or partly
as a consequence of (a) supplying any unsafe goods; (b) a product failure,
defect or hazard in any goods; or (c) inadequate instructions or warnings
provided to the consumer pertaining to any hazard arising from or
associated with the use of any goods, irrespective of whether the harm
resulted from any negligence on the part of the producer, importer,
distributor or retailer, as the case may be. At first glance it thus seems that
the Consumer Protection Act imposes strict liability on all of these
categories of persons but a closer look to the provision and the defences in s
61(4) makes it clear that a form of strict liability is only applicable to
228    2012 De JureThe recognition of strict liability in the case of products liability can be
justified by various other factors: the public interest in the physical-
psychological well-being of human beings requires the highest measure of
protection against defective consumer products; by marketing and
advertising the manufacturer creates a belief in the minds of the public that
his product is safe; strict liability serves as encouragement to take the utmost
degree of care; the manufacturer is, from an economic perspective, the party
most capable of absorbing and spreading the risk of damage by price
increases and insurance.19
Strict liability, however, is not only applied to product liability in South
Africa. It has been applied for quite some time (and has been well-
established) to the employment relationship where an employer may be
held vicariously liable for delicts committed by employees. In addition,
instances where vicarious liability is applied include relationships
between a principal and agent; motor vehicle owner and driver as well as
state and public school.20 Potgieter21 discusses the possibility of
extending vicarious liability to the parent-child relationship and, after
taking into account various theories, case law, policy considerations and
foreign law, concludes as follows:
As has been submitted, the reasons for vicarious liability of parents for the
conduct of their children have to be sought in a number of policy
considerations, for example the risk created by bringing a child into the
world, the fact that the parent rather than the impecunious child is usually
better suited to pay for (or to distribute through insurance) the loss caused by
the child, the notion that possible liability for a child’s conduct may cause the
parent to instruct, control, supervise, guide and discipline the child more
thoroughly regarding potentially damage-causing behaviour. Naturally the
existence of a parent-child relationship should not without further ado give
rise to parental liability, just as an employment relationship in itself does not
constitute vicarious liability: prerequisites must be satisfied for liability to
18 manufacturers and importers. It thus clear that distributors and retailers can
escape liability by proving that “it is unreasonable to expect the distributor
or retailer to have discovered the unsafe product characteristic, failure,
defect or hazard, having regard to that person’s role in marketing the goods
to consumers”.
19 Van der Walt “Die deliktuele aanspreeklikheid van die vervaardiger vir skade
berokken deur middel van sy defekte produk” 1972 THRHR 254; in
Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 4 SA 285 (SCA)
297, 300 the court stated that at that moment no urgent grounds existed to
apply strict product liability in South African law and referred the possible
imposition of strict liability to the legislature: “[F]urther, as to the argument
that strict liability had to be imposed for commercial reasons, that it was
preferable that this should be done by legislation after due Parliamentary
process and investigation so as to produce a comprehensive set of
principles, rules and procedures. Single instances of litigation could not
possibly provide for the depth and breadth of investigation, analysis and
determination necessary to produce, for use across the manufacturing
industry, a cohesive and effective structure by which to impose strict
liability”.
20 Wicke “Vicarious Liability: Not Simply a Matter of Legal Policy” 1998 Stell LR
21 22; Neethling et al 363.
21 Potgieter 2011 Obiter 203.
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categories may offer valuable guidelines, the requirements for a parent’s
vicarious liability, should it be recognised, will have to be worked out with
reference to the distinctive nature of the parent-child relationship in a
particular fact-situation. In this regard it will be useful to investigate instances
in other legal systems where parents are being held liable for the damage
caused by their minor children.
Another interesting example is corporate criminal liability where
individuals who form part of the corporate body can be held liable either
on the basis of the doctrine of identification or vicarious liability.22 In
terms of the doctrine of identification “a corporate body may be
identified with certain key individuals who act on its behalf” whereas
vicarious liability “lays a corporate body open to liability for crimes
committed by individuals in the course of their duties, or in the scope of
their employment and with the intent to further the interests of the
corporation”.23 
To return to the employer-employee relationship: One of the first
cases that dealt with liability of an employer for delicts of his employees
was Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall,24 where the court stated that a master who
uses servants creates risk of harm to others if the servant proves to be
“negligent, inefficient or untrustworthy” and “[i]t follows that if the
servant’s acts in doing his master’s work or his activities are incidental to
or connected with it are carried out in a negligent or improper manner
so as to cause harm to a third party the master is responsible for the
harm”.25
It is generally accepted that the following requirements must be met
in order for an employer to be vicariously liable: An employment
relationship must exist at the time when the employee committed the
delict and the employee must have acted within the scope of his
employment.26 For an employer to be held liable the person committing
the delict must therefore be an employee27 and must have acted in the
22 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde “Corporate Criminal Liability in South
Africa: Time for Change? (part1)” 2011 TSAR 452 453-454.
23 Ibid.
24 1945 AD 733.
25 741.
26 Mkhize v Martens 1914 AD 382 390.
27 In terms of s 213 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), an employee is
defined as: “(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who
works for any person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to
receive, any remuneration; (b) any other person who in any manner assists
in carrying on or conducting the business of the employer.” The common
law definition of an employee has been expanded in order to extend
protection to as many persons as possible. The definitions of “employee” in
the LRA as well as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997
(BCEA); the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of
1993; the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001; and the Skills
Development Act 97 of 1998 all expressly exclude an independent
contractor from the definition of “employee”. It is therefore clear that a
contract of mandate which involves an independent contractor is
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employee’s wrongful conduct and the relationship between him and his
employer.28 The determination of what is inside or outside the scope of
employment has proved to be quite problematic over the years. In
Mkhize,29 for example, it was stated that “the master is answerable for
the torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment,
bearing in mind that an act done by the servant solely for his own interest
and purposes and outside his authority is not done in the course of his
employment, even though it may have been during his employment”. In
Boland Bank Bpk v Bellville Munisipaliteit30 the court explained the
problem regarding the course-of-employment-requirement as follows:
Die probleem is egter om, na aanleiding van die feite van die betrokke saak,
te bepaal of die gewraakte optrede deur die werknemer uitgevoer is binne of
buite sy werksbestek of diensbetrekking. Die blote feit dat die gewraakte
optrede plaasvind terwyl die werknemer met sy werkgewer se sake bemoeid
is, is opsigself nie genoeg om die werkgewer aan aanspreeklikheid bloot te
27 specifically excluded from the doctrine of vicarious liability (See Langley Fox
Building Partnership (Pty) Ltd v De Valance 1991 1 SA 1 (A) 8; Smit v
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 1 SA 51 (A) where the court
listed factors that are indicative of an employment relationship as well as
Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk 1998 3 SA
17 (SCA) 23). Niselow v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd (1998 ILJ 752
(SCA)) dealt with the definition of “employee” in terms of the Labour
Relations Act 28 of 1956. The Court in the Niselow case held (753I) that an
employee at common law undertakes to render a personal service to an
employer. The Court further held that regardless of the second part of the
definition (“... any other person whomsoever who in any manner assists in
the carrying on or conducting of the business of an employer”) it also did
not bring the individual in that case within the scope of the definition. The
Court based this on distinguishing a contract of work and a contract of
service. Consequently, the appellant in that case, who was an agent
contracted to canvass insurance business for the respondent, was carrying
on and conducting his own business rather than assisting in the carrying on
or conducting of the business of the respondent. In the labour appeal court
the court noted, however, that the supreme court of appeal “did not have the
benefit of argument on the second part of the definition of ‘employee’”. (See
also Smit & Botha’s discussion on whether members of parliament ere
employees and employers for purposes of the Protected Disclosures Act 26
of 2000 (“Is the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 Applicable to
Members of Parliament? 2011 TSAR 815 815-829)). In 2002, the LRA and
BCEA were amended to include the rebuttable presumption of employment
in order to assist persons who claim to be employees rather than
independent contractors. These factors are: (i) the manner in which the
person works is subject to the control or direction of another person; (ii) the
person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another
person; (iii) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the
person forms part of that organisation; (iv) the person has worked for that
person for an average of at least 40 hours per month over the last three
months; (iv) the person is economically dependent on the other person for
whom he or she works or renders services; (v) the person is provided with
tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or (vi) the person only
works for or renders service to one person.
28 Wicke 1998 Stell LR 21 30.
29 394.
30 1981 2 SA 437(C) 444-445.
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uitvoering van die werk wat aan die werknemer toevertrou is, neerkom, of
iets is wat bykomstig is tot, of verbonde is aan sy dienste.31
It is clear from various examples over the years that there is no general
rule when it comes to the question whether the act of the employee falls
inside or outside the scope of employment. It is largely dependent on the
facts of each case.32 To deal with this difficulty, the courts have
developed certain sub-rules. These include the so-called deviation
cases,33 “intentional misconduct (wilful wrongdoing) where the
employee did not act in furtherance of the employer’s business” and
unauthorised transport of passengers in the vehicles of the employer.34
In the past, deviation cases were the focus of most cases dealing with
vicarious liability and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Safety
& Security v Jordaan t/a Andre Jordaan Transport35 held that 
[i]n each case, whether the employer is to be held liable or not must depend
on the nature and extent of the deviation. Once the deviation is such that it
cannot be reasonably held that the employee is still exercising the functions
to which he was appointed or still carrying out some instruction of his
employer, the latter will cease to be liable. Whether that stage has been
reached is essentially a question of degree.
The court then added that a close consideration of the facts will be taken
into account on a case to case basis.36
In 2003 and 2004 two very important judgments with regard to
liability of employers emerged from the Labour Court and the High Court
respectively. These cases were Ntsabo v Real Security CC37 and
Grobler.38 Ntsabo dealt with the statutory liability of an employer for
unfair discrimination or harassment39 of employees against other
employees, whereas Grobler dealt with an employer’s vicarious liability
31 See also Ngubetole v Administrator, Cape 1975 3 SA 1 (A); Viljoen v Smith
1997 ILJ 61 (A); Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v
ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1997 2 SA 591 (W); ABSA Bank Ltd v Bond
Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 2001 1 SA 372 (SCA); Ess Kay Electronics Pty
Ltd v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 2001 (SA) 1214 (SCA).
32 Wicke 1998 Stell LR 21 30; Calitz 2005 TSAR 215 218.
33 Wicke 1998 Stell LR 21 31. In Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall (supra) the court also
dealt with deviation cases and said that it is a question of degree with regard
to space and time when determining if the act of an employee falls within
scope of employment or not.
34 Calitz 2005 TSAR 215 218.
35 2000 ILJ 2585 2588D-F.
36 See also Viljoen v Smith (supra) and African Guarantee and Indemnity Co
Ltd v Minister of Justice 1959 2 SA 437 (A) with regard to this matter.
37 (2003) 24 ILJ 2341 (LC).
38 This case was taken on appeal as Media 24 Ltd v Grobler 2005 6 SA (SCA).
39 Etsebeth “The Growing Expansion of Vicarious Liability in the Information
Age (part 2)” 2006 TSAR 752 points out that it is “evident that companies
can be held vicariously liable in the case of the inappropriate use/abuse of
corporate internet and email facilities, in the form of harassment,
discrimination, defamation (resulting from ill-conceived wording in an e-
mail), copyright infringement (where the employee carelessly downloads
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cases were not similar but, when compared, they clearly illustrate a
development of the common law with reference to vicarious liability. The
Grobler case included sexual harassment, applied common law remedies
rather than statutory remedies, and used the High Court to enforce these
remedies, whereas Ntsabo utilised the statutory remedies and used the
Labour Court to enforce these remedies.40 In Ntsabo the court found that
the supervisor’s conduct was a contravention of section 60 of the
Employment Equity Act41 and that it amounted to sexual harassment
and constituted unfair discrimination which is prohibited in terms of
section 6(3) of that Act. Damages were awarded to Ntsabo for breach of
this duty. In Grobler the court held that the employer was vicariously
liable for the supervisor sexually harassing Mrs Grobler. It has clearly
been established that whether an employee acts within the scope of his
employment or not is a subjective-objective test.42 In Minister of Police v
Rabie,43 the court explained the so-called standard test44 for vicarious
liability as follows:
It seems clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and
purposes, although occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the
course or scope of his employment, and that in deciding whether an act by
the servant does fall, some reference is to be made to the servant’s intention
[...] The test is in this regard subjective. On the other hand, if there is
nevertheless a sufficiently close link between the servant’s acts for his own
interests and purposes and the business of his master, the master may yet be
liable. This is an objective test.
In 2005 the Constitutional Court in K v Minister of Safety & Security45
again examined the sufficiently-close-connection-test (as mentioned in
Rabie and discussed below).46 The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeal due to the fact that the employees’ acts were outside the
course and scope of their employment and that the question in deviation
cases was “whether the deviation was of such a degree that it can be said
that in doing what he or she did the employee was still exercising
functions to which he or she had been appointed or was still carrying out
some instruction of his or her employer”.47 It is however possible for an
39 and disseminates copyright material and software), criminal liability (if child
pornography is downloaded) and even liability under the law of contract
(where an employee inadvertently forms a contract through an email)”.
40 See for detailed discussion Smit & Van der Nest “When Sisters are doing it
for themselves: Sexual Harassment Claims in the Workplace” 2004 TSAR
520 520-543; Le Roux “Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Reflecting on
Grobler v Naspers” 2004 ILJ 1897 1897-1900; Whitcher “Two Roads to an
Employer’s Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment: S Grobler v Naspers
Bpk en’n Ander and Ntsabo v Real Security CC” 2004 ILJ 1907 1907-1924.
41 55 of 1998.
42 Neethling et al 368.
43 1986 1 SA 117 (A) 134.
44 Neethling et al 368-369.
45 [2005] ZACC 8; 2005 6 SA 419 (CC); 2005 9 BCLR 835 (CC).
46 See 3 1 4 1 below.
47 K v Minister of Safety & Security 2005 26 ILJ 681 (SCA) par 4.
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outside of it at the same time. This “dual capacity”48 of the employee
again featured in Bezuidenhout NO v Eskom.49 In casu the court held that
when there is an express instruction not to transport passengers while
the employee is entrusted with driving the employer’s vehicle and the
passenger is then injured, the employer was not vicariously liable
because the employee did not act within the course and scope of
employment. This illustrates that an employer will not be vicariously
liable for all actions50 of employees. On the other hand, it must be
pointed out that an employer will not escape liability merely because the
conduct was “fraudulent,51 unauthorised and undertaken for the
employee’s own interest”.52 If a “sufficiently close link between the
employee’s conduct and what the employer authorises to perform is
established, the employer is vicariously liable”.53
3 Critical Analysis of F v Minister of Safety and 
Security 
3 1 Facts
The facts of the case were in short that Ms F visited a night club in George
on 14 October 1998.54 After midnight (on 15 October) she was offered a
lift home by one Van Wyk. There were two other passengers in the car.55
It was also common cause that Van Wyk was a police officer on standby
duty.56 The court referred to Standing Order 6, issued by the National
Commissioner of the South African Police Service in June 1997, and
explains that “standby duty” means that Van Wyk could have been called
upon to “attend any crime-related incident if the need arose”.57 In
addition, Van Wyk had the use of an unmarked vehicle if he needed it for
48 Le Roux “Vicarious Liability: Revisiting an Old Acquaintance” 2003 ILJ 1879.
49 2003 24 ILJ 1084 (SCA).
50 See Costa da Oura Restaurant (Pty) Ltd t/a Umdloti Bush Tavern v Reddy
2003 24 ILJ 1337 (SCA) where an employee (a barman) assaulted a patron
because he was upset about the quality of service and made comments
about it. The barman later followed the patron outside and assaulted him.
The Court held that the employee’s conduct was a personal act of aggression
that was neither in furtherance of the employer’s interest nor under his
authority.
51 See Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) where the court held
that the Minister of Finance is vicariously liable for the employees’
deliberate dishonest actions (fraud) in the tender process. The court held the
Minister is liable “if objectively seen, there is a sufficiently close link
between the self-directed conduct and the employer’s business” (par 28);
see also Neethling & Potgieter “Middellike Aanspreeklikheid vir ’n Opsetlike
Delik” 2007 TSAR 616 for discussion of the Gore-case.
52 Smit & Van der Nest 2004 TSAR 520 536.
53 Ibid.
54 Par 8.
55 Ibid.
56 Par 9.
57 Ibid.
234    2012 De Jurestandby duty and he was being paid the prescribed hourly tariff. Ms F
also noticed that the vehicle was equipped with a police radio.
Ms F was seated on the back seat of the vehicle with one of the other
passengers when they left the club. After they had been dropped off, Van
Wyk asked her to move to the front passenger seat, which she did.58
Upon moving to the front seat, Ms F saw a pile of police dockets and
when she asked Van Wyk about these, he replied that he was a private
detective. Ms F understood that he was a policeman.59 Instead of driving
her home as agreed, Van Wyk drove towards Kaaimansrivier and told Ms
F that he wanted to see his friends before dropping her off. At that point
Ms F became suspicious.60 When they approached Kaaimansrivier, Van
Wyk stopped the vehicle at a dark spot. Ms F got out of the vehicle, ran
away and hid. Van Wyk left after a while.61 After a while Ms F
approached the road and hitchhiked. Van Wyk’s vehicle then stopped
next to her and again he offered to take her home. Ms F was desperate
and agreed. She testified that she believed that Van Wyk was a policeman
and she trusted him despite her suspicions.62
It is on their way to Ms F’s home that Van Wyk unexpectedly turned
off the road near Kraaibos. Again Ms F tried to flee but Van Wyk
prevented her and then assaulted and raped her.63 He threatened to kill
her if she told anybody.64 However, Ms F reported the crime and this
resulted in Van Wyk’s conviction and subsequent sentence.65
Upon reaching the age of majority in December 2005, Ms F instituted
an action for damages against the Minister of Safety and Security and
Van Wyk.66 
3 2 Judgment of the High Court 
Bozalek J applied the test that was laid down in K and found the Minister
vicariously liable for the damages suffered by Ms F.67 The court ruled that
there was a sufficiently strong link between Mr Van Wyk’s actions and
his employer’s business to justify that conclusion. The court highlighted
three factors in support of its conclusion, namely Van Wyk’s being in
possession of a police vehicle, Ms F’s understanding that Van Wyk was
a policeman, and what the court refers to as the nature of the assistance
that Van Wyk pretended to offer as well as the normal task of members
of the police service, which is “to protect vulnerable groups such as
58 Par 10.
59 Ibid.
60 Par 11.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Par 14.
64 Ibid.
65 Par 15.
66 Par 16.
67 F v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 606 (WCC). 
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Ms F’s victory potentially opening the floodgates to the state’s strict
liability for delictual acts committed by the police. Bozalek J’s response
was that the test in K was sufficiently flexible to allow a case-by-case
determination of the issues.69 
Various prominent academics (such as Neethling70 and Scott71)
commented on the judgment of the High Court. In his discussion of the
High Court judgment, Neethling referred to K as well as Minister of Safety
and Security v Luiters72 and specifically commented that the
“authoritative and well-reasoned”73 decision of Bozalek J deserves his full
support.74 The fact is that the state is in the same position as other
employers and that the state may escape vicarious liability when it can
show that the official was not “pro hac vice an employee of the state at
the time when the delict was committed.”75 The latter will be the case
when the state did not at the particular time have the right to control the
employee. Control, according to Neethling, “does not mean factual
control but the right of control”.76 Therefore, control is not only
important when it is ascertained that an employer-employer relationship
existed but it is also a factor that must be taken into account when
determining whether “a sufficiently close link existed between the
conduct of the employee and his employment, and therefore whether the
employee acted within the scope of his employment”.77 
It must, however, be noted that generally a distinction is drawn
between on-duty or off-duty misconduct. If, for example, the conduct is
regarded as off-duty and it is determined that it falls outside the scope
and course of employment, the employer will thus not be held vicariously
liable. Generally speaking, an employer can only take action against an
employee if his conduct is linked to the workplace. However, when an
employee’s conduct falls outside the workplace the employer can hold an
employee accountable for this conduct if it impacts on the business of the
employer. Such conduct would impact on the employer’s business “if it
prejudices a legitimate business interest or undermines the relationship
of trust and confidence that is a necessary component of the employ-
68 Par 18.
69 Par 19c.
70 Neethling “Vicarious Liability of the State for Rape by a Police Official” 2011
TSAR 186.
71 Scott “Middellike Aanspreeklikheid van die Staat vir Misdadige Polisie-
optrede: Die Heilsame Ontwikkeling Duur Voort: F v Minister of Safety and
Security 2010 1 SA 606 (WKK)” 2011 TSAR 135 135-147.
72 2007 2 SA 106 (CC).
73 Neethling 2011 TSAR 186 189.
74 See also Neethling “Liability of the State for Rape by a Policeman: The Saga
Takes a New Direction: Minister of Safety and Security v F 2011 3 SA 487
(SCA)” 2011 Obiter 428 430. 
75 Neethling 2011 TSAR 186 190.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
236    2012 De Jurement relationship”.78 However, it must be pointed out that dismissal
could only be justified if the misconduct, albeit on or off-duty, has a
serious impact on the employment relationship.79 On the point of
misconduct and with reference to police officials, Neethling points out
that: 
[t]he right of control is the highest level when a policeman is officially on duty
(as in the K case), or where an off-duty officer has put himself on duty (as in
the Luiters case), but the level of control is also acceptable where direct
control is attenuated or limited because the officer is on standby-duty (as in
the F case). But this does not mean that vicarious liability cannot exist where
a police official committed a delict whilst off duty. Although the element of
control is absent at that particular time, Bozalek J (618C-G) pointed out that
the Rabie case (133-134) serves as authority for the proposition that the state
does not necessarily escape vicarious liability for a police officer’s delicts
simply because he is formally off duty, dressed in private clothes and
commits the delict purely for his private and selfish purposes. This will be the
case where an off-duty policeman, without putting himself on duty,
nevertheless mala fide purported to act as policeman in committing the delict
in question.80
It must be stressed that Bozalek J also referred to the “creation of risk of
harm” as formulated in Rabie.81 Neethling and Scott both discuss this
issue in some detail. Scott,82 explains that the court attaches much value
to the risk principle in light of the fact that Bozalek J was willing to hold
the state liable, even though the employee had no previous convictions.
Neethling is correct that the creation of risk-approach should be
considered in all instances of intentional wrongdoing by an employee
and that: 
78 Van Niekerk, Christianson, McGregor, Smit & Van Eck Law@work (2012)
269.
79 Ibid.
80 Neethling 2011 TSAR 189. Scott’s (2011 TSAR 145) sentiments are similar to
the extent where he concludes as follows: “Daar word aan die hand gedoen
dat hierdie uitspraak onafwendbaar was in die lig van die presedent wat in
die baanbrekende beslissing van regter O’Regan in die K-saak neergelê is.
Die enigste werklike verskil tussen die onderhawige feitestel en die feite in
daardie saak, is dat die polisiebeampte in hierdie geval, anders as in dié van
K, nie voltyds aan diens was nie. Daar kan volle instemming betuig word
met die feit dat hierdie verskil nie voldoende rede was om die onderhawige
geval van die K-saak te onderskei en slegs om daardie rede ’n
teenoorgestelde beslissing te vel nie. Die motivering wat regter Bozalek
verskaf vir sy hantering van die effek van die feit dat die tweede verweerder
ten tyde van delikspleging op blote bystandsdiens was, is myns insiens ten
volle geregverdig en lofwaardig. Die gevolg van al die statutêre bepalings en
dicta uit die regspraak wat die regter aanhaal ter stawing van sy
interpretasie van die gevolg van bystandsdiens word trouens treffend
geparafraseer in ’n enkele sinnetjie uit Rabie v Minister of Police 1984 1 SA
786 (W), waarin die standaardtoets finaal sy beslag gekry het: ‘When a
member of the South African Police Force is off duty it cannot be suggested
that his statutory duties as a member of the Force or that his authority are
suspended’ (791F).”
81 625B-626C.
82 2011 TSAR 135 143-144 (authors’ emphasis).
  The past, present and future of vicarious liability in South Africa    237[a]s a general guideline an employer should be liable for an (intentional) delict
by his employee if his appointment and work conditions enabled him to
commit the delict (and hence created a heightened risk of prejudice) in such a
manner.83
This heightened risk of prejudice would be present where employees
(such as police officials) have been placed in a position of trust or
authority and the possibility of abuse and as well as the fact that the
employee was on duty (or stand-by duty, as in the F case) when the delict
was committed, should be indicative of liability and should be of
increasing weight the more the employee used the “trappings” of his
work while committing a delict on duty.
It seems that employers are at risk of always getting the short end of
the stick and this seems harsh. However, if the employer (in the current
discussion the state) is held to be vicariously liable and all of the above-
mentioned are established, the employer can discipline or dismiss an
employee for misconduct. Fairness dictates that, in addition to a fair
reason, the employer must follow a fair procedure. It will not make a
difference if the employer decides not to dismiss the employee for his
misconduct. Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd84 is useful in this
regard. The Constitutional Court lists the following factors that must be
taken into account when a commissioner is called upon to determine
whether a misconduct dismissal was fair: (i) the totality of the
circumstances; (ii) the importance of the rule that has been breached by
the employee; (iii) the employer’s reason for imposing the sanction of
dismissal; (iv) the employee’s reason for challenging the sanction of
dismissal; (v) the harm caused by the employee’s conduct; (vi)
considerations of other corrective measures; (vii) the impact the
dismissal will have on the employee; and (viii) the employee’s service
record.85 In addition to taking action short of dismissal (or dismissal) the
employer can also exercise his right of recourse against the errant
employee. For instance, an employer can make deductions from an
employee’s remuneration. Such deductions are, however, subject to the
employee agreeing in writing to the deduction or where the deduction is
required or permitted in terms of a law, collective agreement, court order
83 Neethling 2011 TSAR 186 191.
84 2007 28 ILJ 2405 (CC) par 78. See also Lipka v Voltex PE 2010 31 ILJ 2199
(CCMA) in this regard.
85 The Code of Good Practice: Dismissal sets out the requirements of a fair pre-
dismissal procedure in cases of alleged misconduct. This procedure is laid
out in item 4(1) as follows: “Normally, the employer should conduct an
investigation to determine whether there are grounds for dismissal. This
does not need to be a formal inquiry. The employer should notify the
employee of the allegations using a form and language that the employee
can reasonably understand. The employee should be allowed the
opportunity to state a case in response to the allegations. The employee
should be entitled to a reasonable time to prepare a response and to the
assistance of a trade union representative or fellow employee. After the
inquiry, the employer should communicate the decision taken, and
preferably furnish the employee with a written notification of that decision.”
238    2012 De Jureor arbitration award. When a deduction is made due to a written
agreement it may only be made to reimburse an employer: 
(a) for loss or damage only if the loss or damage occurred in the course of
employment and was due to the fault of the employee; (b) the employer has
followed a fair procedure and has given the employee a reasonable
opportunity to show why the deductions should not be made; (c) the total
amount of the debt does not exceed the actual amount of the loss or damage;
and (d) the total deductions from the employee’s remuneration in terms of
this subsection do not exceed one-quarter of the employee’s remuneration in
money.86 
With reference to the police services, Scott concludes as follows:
Dit is duidelik dat daar ’n balans gevind sal moet word tussen die
toenemende “wetteloosheid” van die sentrale polisiediens enersyds, en die
groeiende blootstelling van die algemene publiek aan wetteloosheid en
misdaad, andersyds. Inagneming van die konstitusionele imperatiewe wat
betref veiligheid en sekuriteit, wat in talle meer onlangse wetgewende
maatreëls en regspraak gestalte gevind het (soos deeglik uit die onderhawige
saak blyk), noodsaak na my mening ’n uitspraak soos dié van regter Bozalek:
mens kan as’t ware sê dat hoe hagliker die posisie van lede van die publiek as
gevolg van die vergrype van lede van die polisiediens word, hoe swaarder
word die konstitusionele plig van die staat om daardie tipe gewraakte optrede
goed te maak. In ’n mate kom dit dus voor – en tereg – dat die staat wesentlik
en vir praktiese doeleindes as ’n versekeraar optree vir die vergrype wat tot
hierdie soort nadeel aanleiding gee. Hierdie toedrag van sake is egter aan die
staat self te wyte, hoofsaaklik as gevolg van die versuim van die staat om ’n
goedopgeleide, professionele polisiediens te ontwikkel en in stand te hou. Hy
wat met sy bewuste aanstellingsbeleid bedenklike karakters in uniform steek,
moet die gevolge dra wat deur sy optrede veroorsaak word. Indien daar dan
“fouteer” moet word wat die verskynsel van middellike staatsaanspreek-
likheid vir polisiedelikte betref, is dit sonder twyfel te verkies dat dit in die
rigting van ’n wyer staatsaanspreeklikheid sal geskied, as in die rigting van
die blootstelling van lede van die algemene publiek aan ’n bestel waar die
enigste remedie van die slagoffer teen ’n platsak individu is. Ter tempering
behoort egter dan heroorweeg te word of die staat sonder meer regresloos
behoort in te staan vir die regskostes aangegaan ter verdediging van sy
werknemers in litigasie waar beslis word dat die werknemers flagrant
onwettig of onregmatig opgetree het.87 
Scott also stresses that the principle ought to be that the legal costs must
be claimed from the convicted criminal (the employee) and that vicarious
liability should not exempt the primary perpetrator (the employee). He
adds that the employer should be entitled to claim all legal costs that
stem from him being held vicariously liable from the employee.88
86 S 34(1) & (2) BCEA.
87 Scott 2011 TSAR 135 147.
88 Ibid.
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The supreme court of appeal reversed the decision of the High Court.
Nugent JA, with Snyders JA and Pilay AJA concurring, argued that the
state’s liability in K was based only on the delictual omission of the on-
duty policeman involved.89 Second, it was argued that an intentional
delictual commission cannot attract the state’s vicarious liability. Proper
interpretation of K leads one to conclude that the state is not vicariously
liable for the positive delictual acts of police officials but only for their
omissions.90 In addition, because Van Wyk was not on duty, he was not
engaged in the business of the police service and he had not breached his
duty to protect Ms F. What was even more alarming was the court’s
conclusion that an off-duty policeman has no duty to protect members of
the public and cannot therefore be held liable for their failure to protect
a victim of crime. Because there was no duty upon Van Wyk, he cannot
be held personally liable.91 In addition, the majority stated that a
policeman cannot be said to be “engaged in the affairs or business of his
employer” when he commits rape and it cannot even be said that rape is
an “improper mode” of exercising authority.92 
The minority as per Maya JA made a more sensible observation. They
stated that although the rape had nothing to do with the performance of
Van Wyk’s official duties, there was a sufficiently close link “between his
acts of personal gratification and the business of the police service”.93 In
addition, Van Wyk had offered to take Ms F home, thereby placing
himself on duty. As well, because Van Wyk was a policeman, Ms F was
induced to trust Van Wyk and accept a lift from him.94 Another
interesting observation by the minority was that policy considerations
underpin vicarious liability in matters such as these. It is also an
employer’s duty to ensure that no one is injured as a result of an
employee’s improper or negligent conduct when performing his
duties.95 In addition, the minority found that K applies to so-called
deviation cases. This particular aspect was discussed in some detail by
the Constitutional Court.96 
89 Par 20.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Par 22.
93 Par 23.
94 Par 24.
95 Ibid.
96 See par 3.4 below. The minority judgment of Maya JA, however, is not
without criticism. Scott “Die Hoogste Hof van Appèl Smoor Heilsame
Regsontwikkeling: Minister of Safety and Security v F 2011 3 SA 487 (HHA)”
2011 TSAR 773 786 argues that although the minority judgment was less
substantial than the majority judgment of Nugent AJ, the minority judgment
is preferred nevertheless. The reason Scott prefers it is because it followed
the constitutional imperatives (as mentioned in K) to protect vulnerable
groups such as women and children. The majority judgment is also
criticised by this author and he concludes as follows: “[i]ndien die
uitgebreide en meer beredeneerde meerderheidsuitspraak van appèlregter
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The substantive issue before the Constitutional Court was whether the
state could be held vicariously liable for damages arising from the rape
of a young girl by a policeman on stand-by duty.
It is often said that when two lawyers agree, at least one did not apply
his mind. In this particular case, Mogoeng J and with him Cameron J,
Kampepe J, Nkabinde J Skweyiya J and van der Westhuizen J found in
favour of Ms F. Froneman J came to the same conclusion but delivered a
separate judgment and Yacoob J found in favour of the Minister. These
three judgments will be discussed separately.
3 4 1 Majority Judgment
Mogoeng sets out to explain that vicarious liability “means that a person
may be held liable for the wrongful act or omission of another even
though the former did not, strictly speaking, engage in any wrongful
conduct”.97 Employment is one such relationship and the employer is
vicariously liable for the wrongful acts or omissions of an employee
committed within the course and scope of employment “or whilst the
employee was engaged in any activity reasonably identical to it”.98
The court then explains that there are two tests to determine whether
there is vicarious liability. The first is the standard test which applies
when an employee commits a delict while going about the employer’s
business. The second test applies in the so-called deviation cases where
the wrongdoing takes place outside the course and scope of
employment.99 The court explains that the matter in casu is definitely a
deviation case and then proceeds to the pre-constitutional case of
Feldman as authority. In casu an employee used his employer’s vehicle
to deliver parcels as instructed by his employer and afterwards attended
to personal matters. He drank alcohol, drove back to his employer’s
premises and negligently collided with and killed the father of two
dependants. The majority held the employer liable for the minors’ loss of
support.100 
Mogoeng observes that Feldman proposes that employees are
extensions of their employers and thus they create a risk of harm to
96 Nugent nugter betrag word, tref dit die leser dat dit net sowel in die pre-
konstitusionele era gelewer kon wees: daar is nie eens ’n enkele beroep op
die grondwetlike beginsels wat in die Carmichele- en K-sake gefigureer het
nie. Bloot wat hierdie aspek betref, is die hoogste hof van appèl se
meerderheidsuitspraak ’n retrogressiewe stap in ’n andersins lofwaardige en
gesonde regsontwikkeling wat die grondwetlike regte van verkragte en
aangerande vroue en kinders betref”.
97 Par 40.
98 Par 41.
99 Ibid.
100 Par 42. The court quotes Watermeyer CJ in Feldman. See discussion in 2
above.
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lies the duty: that employers should ensure that their employees do not
do the opposite of what they are supposed to do. In addition, where
employees do the opposite of what they are supposed to do, a link must
be established between the employers’ business and the delictual
conduct complained of in order to hold the employer vicariously
liable.101
The court then comments on Rabie.102 Here a mechanic who was
employed by the police conducted a wrongful arrest, detention and
assault of the plaintiff. At the time of the arrest, the perpetrator was not
wearing a police uniform and he was off duty.103 Mogoeng comments
that Rabie is an example of an employee’s radical deviation from the
tasks incidental to his employment and also comments that Rabie
illustrates that even if a servant acts solely for his own purpose (which is
a subjective enquiry relating to his intent), if there is a sufficiently close
relationship between the servant’s acts and the “business of his master”,
the latter may be liable. In determining the link, an objective test is
used.104
This argument was employed in both Rabie and K.105 Therefore, the
court formulates the crisp legal question in casu as “whether there was a
close connection between the wrongful conduct of the policeman and the
nature of their employment”. The court correctly observes that Van Wyk
did not rape Ms F in the furtherance of his duties or “the constitutional
mandate of his employer.”106 Au contraire! Van Wyk pursued his own
selfish interests and if one employs the subjective test in Rabie and K,
there cannot be state liability. However, the second leg of the test which
pertains to the objective enquiry raises both factual questions and
questions of law.107 The normative components that would determine
the Minister’s liability are stated as the state’s constitutional obligations
101 Par 45.
102 1986 1 SA 117 (A).
103 Par 46.
104 Rabie 134C-E.
105 The court quotes the following passage from K: “The approach makes it
clear that there are two questions to be asked. The first is whether the
wrongful acts were done solely for the purposes of the employee. This
question requires a subjective consideration of the employee’s state of mind
and is a purely factual question. Even if it is answered in the affirmative,
however, the employer may nevertheless be liable vicariously if the second
question, an objective one, is answered affirmatively. That question is
whether, even though the acts done have been done solely for the purpose
of the employee, there is nevertheless a sufficiently close link between the
employee’s acts for his own interests and the purposes and the business of
the employer. This question does not raise purely factual questions, but
mixed questions of fact and law. The questions of law it raises relate to
‘what is sufficiently close’ to give rise to vicarious liability. It is in answering
this question that a court should consider the need to give effect to the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” (Par 32).
106 Par 51.
107 Par 52. The court quotes O’Regan in K par 32.
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the police, the significance of a policeman having been on standby duty
or off duty, the policeman’s rape and simultaneous omission to protect
the victim and whether there is an intimate link between the policeman’s
conduct and his employment.108 The court then deals with each of these
aspects at length.
As far as the state’s constitutional obligations are concerned, the court
sets out to explain that the state has a general duty to protect members
of the public against violations of their constitutional rights.109 The court
mentions at the outset that the state has obligations to prevent crime and
to protect members of the public.110 The court mentions that this aspect,
together with Ms F’s constitutional rights, form the “prism through which
this enquiry should be conducted”.111 As far as Ms F’s constitutional
rights are concerned, the court mentions her rights to freedom and
security of the person112 and inherent dignity as the rights that should be
protected and respected.113
The court deals with sexual violence against women and children in
some detail and re-iterates that the state should be at the forefront in the
fight against these crimes and that there is definitely a normative basis
for holding the state liable for the wrongful conduct of a policeman, albeit
one on standby duty.114 
The second matter pertains to trust. This lays a normative basis for
holding the state liable and it provides the factual connection between
the employment and the wrongful conduct.115 In the case of the police
service, reliance is placed on each individual member to execute its
constitutional mandate to the public.116 Here, the court again refers to K
and makes the very important point that “the employment of someone
as a police official may rightly be equated to an invitation extended by
the police service to the public to repose their trust in that employee”.117
In addition, when that trust is abused there is a link between the
employee’s employment and the misconduct complained of.118
Therefore, where a child or a woman places trust in a policeman and that
trust is violated, he would be personally liable to that woman or child
and, in addition, if the policeman’s employment as a policeman secured
the trust that was placed in him, the state might be held vicariously
liable.119 Therefore it makes little difference whether the policeman was
108 Par 52.
109 Par 53.
110 Par 54.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid.
114 Par 62.
115 Ibid.
116 Par 63.
117 Ibid. K par 57.
118 Par 64.
119 Par 66.
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of trust are of importance here.120
On the interplay between the commission and the omission, the Court
provided a detailed judgment. The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that
the state can only be vicariously liable for an omission of an on-duty
policeman who was under an obligation to protect a victim who was
harmed in his presence and not for a positive act such as rape.121
However, this proves to be an incorrect interpretation of K because in the
latter case the Court stressed that there was a simultaneous act (rape) and
omission (failure to protect the victim) and both were equally
important.122
Mogoeng J then turns to the question relating to a sufficiently-close
connection between the policeman’s delictual conduct and his
employment. He states that normative factors are important here. Ms F
placed her trust in Van Wyk and she was betrayed.123 Even though Van
Wyk was on standby, the use of the police car facilitated the rape. In
addition, he had the power to place himself on duty and the dockets in
the car made Van Wyk identifiable as a policeman.124
The majority concludes that the Minister is vicariously liable, even
though the case is distinguishable from K because of the fact that the
policemen were on duty and Van Wyk was not.125
3 4 2 Froneman J 
A very interesting point in F is that Froneman J also holds the Minister
liable but for different reasons than the majority judgment as discussed
in the previous paragraph. Interestingly, the learned judge observes that
the majority holds the state liable on the basis of vicarious liability and
believes that the “close connection” test as in K was correctly applied in
casu.126 As a means of introduction, Froneman J states:
We should recognise that state delictual liability in circumstances where the
state has a general constitutional and statutory duty to protect people from
crime is usually ‘direct’, and not ‘vicarious’ in the sense traditionally
understood by that term. This is because the state invariably acts through the
instruments of its organs – state officials performing public duties. The
difficult normative issue of when the state is liable in delict for their conduct
should in my view no longer be dealt with as an aspect of vicarious liability
120 Par 68.
121 Par 69.
122 Parr 71-73.
123 Par 78.
124 Parr 80-81.
125 Also refer to Neethling & Potgieter “Deliktuele staatsaanspreeklikheid weens
polisieverkragting” LitNet Akademies 9(1), March 2012 (accessed at
www.LitNet.co.za on 27-07-2012). 
126 Par 88.
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our law of delict are present when instruments of the state act.127
Froneman J identifies four reasons why it is necessary to move beyond
vicarious liability. The first of these relates to the reason why the court in
K found it necessary to use the “language of vicarious liability”.128 The
second is to acknowledge the difficulties related to the language of
vicarious liability where the state’s constitutional and statutory duties are
concerned, the third is the state’s acting through its organs and
employees and the fourth is the question whether wrongfulness as a
delictual requirement is more suited to limit state liability than the
“sufficiently close link” test.129
The judge mentions that the main judgment does not deal with direct
liability because it was not argued. Nevertheless, Froneman J considers
the pleadings and the evidence an appropriate basis for considering the
state’s direct liability. He mentions that possible prejudice that may have
been caused by using direct liability could have been addressed by calling
for further argument or for referring the matter back to the high court but
as that had not taken place, the judge proceeds to apply the “substantive
normative considerations pioneered by K”.
As far as the language of vicarious liability is concerned, Froneman J
begins by explaining that vicarious liability in its traditional formulation
“may imply that there is no normative link between the conduct of an
innocent employer ... and the culpable conduct of the employee”.130
However, there is a normative link between the employer-employee
relationship and the delict and this link is the requirement that the delict
must have been committed in the course and scope of the employee’s
employment.131 According to the judge, this requirement gave rise to
two “fallacies”, which was that scope of employment was a question of
fact, and also that this rule had to be treated as separate from the reasons
of justification for the rule.132
According to Froneman J, K exposed both these false assertions. He
states that vicarious liability has a normative character which relates not
to the wrongfulness issue but to the “sufficiently close connection”
investigation.133 In addition, K uses the language of vicarious liability as
this was the basis upon which state delictual liability was always
approached. The learned judge provides a short historical overview of
vicarious state liability and then concludes that even though K applied the
values of the Constitution, that judgment still uses traditional vicarious
liability.134 He doubts whether it is at all appropriate and quotes
127 Par 89.
128 Par 90.
129 Ibid.
130 Par 93.
131 Ibid.
132 Par 94.
133 Par 96. Froneman J refers to par 32, 45 and 49 of K.
134 Par 98.
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employees but rather the state or public authority itself.
The next nine paragraphs of the judgment deal with the difficulties of
vicarious liability and these may be summarised as the overlap between
vicarious liability and direct liability on the one hand, and the potential
conceptual difficulties on the other. As a means of introducing the
discussion on these difficulties, Froneman J refers to O’Regan J in K
where she concluded that the state was vicariously liable in delict for
three reasons. First, the state and policeman had a general statutory and
constitutional duty to prevent crime and protect members of the public.
Second, on the facts, the policeman had a specific duty to assist K and
third, the harmful conduct of the policeman constituted a simultaneous
commission and omission because the omission was their failure to
protect K from harm.136 
From this observation the Supreme Court of Appeal in F deducted that
only omissions by policemen provided a basis for delictual liability and
where there was a positive act, there could not be vicarious liability. The
SCA also interpreted K to signify that where the policemen were
personally liable for their omissions, the state was vicariously liable, but
the state could also have been directly liable for its own omission.137 In
addition, Froneman J mentions that with the breach of public duties, it is
essentially about the legal duty not to cause harm negligently to another
and normally this forms part of an enquiry into wrongfulness that is
already dealt with when looking at the conduct of the employee.138
Overall, it seems that the distinction between vicarious liability and direct
liability is not all that clear and for this reason, according to Froneman J,
as well as because of “potential conceptual difficulty”, the question is
whether the delictual liability of the state should not perhaps be
approached differently.139
This then brings Froneman J to a discussion of direct liability of the
state.140 He begins by stating that the state is a legal person in South
135 Baxter Administrative law (1984) 63-632.
136 Par 100.
137 Par 101.
138 Par 104.
139 Par 108.
140 Although Neethling 2011 Obiter 428 437-438 also in the latter part of 2011
commented on the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in F his concerns
regarding direct liability are noteworthy. He feels that the state can only be
vicariously, and not directly, liable for delicts of employees because “[o]n the
face of it, there does not seem to be any room for direct liability of the state
where the sate itself committed a wrong or delict acting through employees.
Seen in this light, Nugent JA’s submission that the SCA decisions in Van
Duivenboden, Van Eeden, Hamilton and Carmichele (in 2004), none of
which was even based on intentional police wrongdoing, should have been
founded upon direct liability of the state acting through the instrument of its
employees, cannot be accepted. In this regard Nugent JA made no attempt
to explain how the conduct of employees acting as functionaries of the state
for the purposes of its direct liability, differs from their conduct acting in the
246    2012 De JureAfrican law.141 In addition, organs of the state are only permitted to
perform the functions entrusted to them by the Constitution.142 This is
also true of the police service and “the acts of state organs are at the same
time acts for which the state is liable, because they are the state’s own
acts”.143 The time is then right to further develop K and to accept direct
and not vicarious liability as the basis for the state’s delictual liability.
According to Froneman J, direct liability had been dismissed in Mhlongo
and Another NO v Minister of Police,144 but that was before the 1996
Constitution.145
The matter of wrongfulness is discussed in detail. Froneman J starts a
novel argument by explaining that the requirement for wrongfulness as
well as the “sufficiently close connection” test involve questions of fact
and law. However, it does matter whether the court makes this
normative assessment in respect of wrongfulness or as part of the “close
connection” test. So, where a state employee breaches a public duty
there is direct liability. The remainder of the discussion does not
introduce anything new on wrongfulness and only reiterates that
constitutional values must be taken into account in establishing whether
there was wrongfulness.146 One of these constitutional values is
accountability and that was evident in cases such as Minister of Safety
and Security v Van Duivenboden147 and Carmichele v Minister of Safety
and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies
Intervening).148
What is strange about Froneman J’s remarks on wrongfulness is that
he states that this element “is determined on the assumption of negligent
state conduct on the part of the official directly involved in the breach of
a public duty” and that “[w]hen one turns to the actual determination of
negligence this assumption obviously falls away”.149 However, it is not
140 course and scope of their employment for the purposes of the state’s
vicarious liability. This can only lead to confusion and create legal
uncertainty in an area where clarity existed beforehand. Clearly, in all these
cases it was the employees who, while acting in the execution of their
legislative duties, negligently breached their duty to prevent crime and
protect the public. For their wrongs or delicts the state was correctly held
vicariously liable.”
141 Par 109.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 1978 2 SA 551 (A).
145 Par 110.
146 Par 121.
147 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA).
148 2001 4 SA 938 (CC). See also Neethling & Potgieter (n 124). The authors do
not seem to prefer vicarious liability to direct liability or vice versa. Instead,
they summarise that one may consider replacing the constitutional court’s
“constitutional” approach to vicarious liability with direct liability as the
requirement of a sufficiently close connection in vicarious liability cases
which deal with rape is over extended.
149 Par 125.
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for wrongfulness first on the particular facts.
In applying the principles so laboriously explained, Froneman J asks
first whether Van Wyk and the Minister owed Ms F a public, legal duty
and what the nature and content of such a duty might be.150 In dealing
with this issue, the judge remarks that Van Wyk’s conduct constituted a
commission because of the rape and a simultaneous omission because
of a failure to protect her.151 In Froneman J’s opinion, the facts do point
to the existence of a legal duty which was intentionally disregarded by
Van Wyk. The judge states:
Similar considerations apply here. I accept that there is no general obligation
on the police to protect citizens from crime where they are not on duty. But
the converse, that they never have that obligation when not on duty, is not
true either. While off-duty, they are entitled to arrest without a warrant. They
may place themselves on duty when the occasion warrants it. When they are
placed in possession of police resources by virtue of their status as police
officials when they are off-duty, particular circumstances might oblige them to
assume their protective duties towards the public. Those circumstances would
arise where, objectively, vulnerable people place their trust in them because
they are police officials.152 
In Froneman J’s opinion, wrongfulness had been established. 
As far as negligence is concerned, the judge explains that Van Wyk’s
actions were deliberate and negligent. No explanation is provided for this
particular conclusion. However, it is the judge’s mission to find that the
state is directly liable and it is well-known that once wrongfulness had
been determined, the next step is to determine fault. The judge finds that
there is no evidence that the state took other reasonable measures to
prevent Van Wyk from committing a delict. He was allowed to continue
service despite his previous convictions and this factor alone points to the
foreseeability of harm.153 The judge fails to deal in detail with the second
leg of the test for negligence, which is preventability and one is left to
assume that it was within the Minister’s power to suspend or dismiss Van
Wyk and in doing so prevent him from using police facilities to
perpetuate crime.
3 4 3 Minority Judgment 
Yacoob J, with Jafta J concurring, ruled that the Minister was not
vicariously liable and they reiterated that the test for vicarious liability
was laid down in K. They are of the view that, unless the court holds that
this particular case was decided incorrectly, the flexible test in K should
be applied.
150 Par 136.
151 Par 137.
152 Par 146.
153 Par 148.
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duty, either subjectively or objectively”.154 In any event, it is not a
decisive factor whether a policeman is on or off duty but, according to
the minority, Van Wyk was on a “frolic of his own”.155 In addition, there
was “no official police promise of safe carriage”.156 On the matter of
trust, the learned judges conclude that there were no reasonable grounds
for Ms F to trust Van Wyk, rather, she had every reason to distrust him
and went with him because she was in a desperate situation.157
On the matter of a simultaneous commission and omission, the
minority argued that neither existed because Van Wyk was not on
duty.158 In the circumstances they conclude that there was not a
sufficient connection between Van Wyk’s deeds and his employment as
a policeman.159
4 Some Observations
From the case under discussion various observations may be made. It
does seem that government liability cases are on the rise and some do
involve disturbing, violent conduct by policemen such as the one in Van
Wyk.
The first observation is that, when properly applied, vicarious liability
serves a purpose in our society. One cannot fault the logic applied by the
majority in F. Here, one can re-iterate the sentiments of Neethling after
the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision and before the Constitutional
Court’s judgment, that: 
[t]he only difference between K and F was that in K the policemen were on
duty when raping K, while in F the rapist was on stand-by duty. The core
question in F was therefore whether a policeman on stand-by duty is on par
with a policeman on duty so that according to the standard test for vicarious
liability he can be found to have acted within the course and scope of his
employment when raping a woman while on stand-by duty.160
It is therefore submitted that Mogoeng J et al came to the correct
conclusion on the facts as all the elements of vicarious liability had been
proven. There is definitely a place for vicarious liability in South African
law even though it is a well-known fact that this enables a plaintiff to
recover his damages from a defendant who is not a so-called “man of
straw”.161 In addition, where all the elements of vicarious liability had
been proven, the employer should be held liable. 
154 Par 155.
155 Par 168.
156 Par 169.
157 Parr 173-174.
158 Par 175.
159 Par 177.
160 2011 Obiter 428 438. 
161 Potgieter 2011 Obiter 189 191.
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confused with course and scope of employment. While it is true that
control is a factor that is looked at in evaluating whether an employer-
employee relationship did exist or whether a sufficiently-close
relationship existed between the conduct of the employee and his
employment, control cannot be equated to scope of employment
because a wrongdoer who was not necessarily under the control of his
employer could still have acted within the course and scope of his
employment.162
The third observation is that although a majority of the Constitutional
Court had re-affirmed the basis of vicarious liability in the employer-
employee relationship, it is also necessary to consider the alternative to
vicarious liability as suggested by Froneman J.163 Although Froneman J
agrees with the majority in holding the Minister liable, he argues that the
basis for liability in casu is direct – as opposed to vicarious – liability. Now
this is intriguing, as direct liability of the state had been severely criticised
before.164 Why then is it mentioned again by Froneman J and do the
reasons for his judgment make sense? Furthermore, is direct liability only
a possibility in cases involving the state or is it a possibility for all actions
against employers?
It is trite law that in order for a defendant to be liable in delict, the
plaintiff needs to prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendant
had committed a wrongful, culpable act which caused damage to the
plaintiff.165 It is also a well-known fact that conduct for purposes of
delictual liability may be in the form of a commission or an omission.
One can see how state organs may be liable for positive acts (such as the
confiscation of property or the poisoning of residents’ water) and then it
is also evident that actionable omissions will include instances where a
state organ had a legal duty to act positively to prevent harm.166 Also,
liability only follows if such an omission is in fact wrongful. The existence
of wrongfulness is always determined with reference to the legal
convictions of the community or the boni mores.167 In Carmichele,168
the Constitutional Court pronounced that in some circumstances, such as
with an omission, there may also be a legal duty on the state to take
positive steps to protect fundamental rights, such as the right to life,
human dignity and freedom and security of the person as entrenched in
the Bill of Rights.169 Failure to do so would be wrongful. 
162 See 3.1.2 above.
163 Par 109.
164 Neethling 2011 Obiter 428 437-438.
165 Neethling et al 4.
166 Neethling et al 30, 57, 76-77.
167 Neethling et al 57.
168 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).
169 Parr 27-29 and 72-74. See also Neethling, Potgieter & Scott Case book on
the Law of delict (2006) 26.
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culpable. There is a primary distinction between intent and negligence as
forms of fault.170 In order to establish intent, there should be the
direction of the will and consciousness of wrongfulness and the test for
intent is subjective.171 Negligence on the other hand is where a person is
blamed for an attitude of carelessness, thoughtlessness because he failed
to adhere to the objective standard of care required of him and test for
negligence is that of the reasonable person or bonus paterfamilias.172
Therefore, a diligens paterfamilias or reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would foresee the reasonable possibility of his
conduct injuring another and he would take reasonable steps to prevent
such harm. Where the defendant had in fact failed to take such steps, he
would have acted negligently.173 
It is against these general rules pertaining to the first three elements of
the delict that Froneman J’s judgment should be viewed. In the first
instance one must agree with Froneman J that the state is a legal
person174 and as such should perform the functions entrusted to it by the
Constitution.175 Therefore, on the issue of the act as a delictual element,
acts of state organs such as the police are acts of the state176 and failures
to act positively where there is a constitutional duty to do so, constitutes
wrongfulness.177 Froneman effectively uses Carmichele in stressing that
the constitutional value of accountability is here the boni mores and it
goes without saying that constitutional values should be taken into
account in establishing wrongfulness. 
On the issue of fault, Froneman J states that Van Wyk’s actions were
both “deliberate and negligent” and fails to explain this statement any
further.178 While it is easy to see that Van Wyk had every intention of
raping Ms F and that fault in the form of intent is present, it is not certain
why Froneman J thought Van Wyk to be negligent as well. However, for
purposes of this argument Van Wyk’s intent suffices. What is interesting
is that Froneman J then also observes that the state was negligent in not
taking reasonable measures to prevent Van Wyk from committing a
delict, this despite the fact that his previous convictions made him a time
bomb and that it was foreseeable that he could cause harm to members
of the public. Therefore, the state’s failure to take reasonable steps to
prevent Van Wyk from causing harm is indicative of the state’s
negligence. Although Froneman J does not discuss preventability of harm
in detail, one can argue that, if the Minister had proper policies in place
170 Neethling et al 123.
171 Neethling et al 126.
172 Neethling et al 131.
173 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430; Neethling et al 133.
174 Par 109. See also Okpaluba & Osode Government Liability: South Africa and
the Commonwealth (2010) 16.
175 Par 109.
176 Ibid.
177 Par 121.
178 Par 148.
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possession of the police vehicle and could not have offered Ms F a lift
home. If the wrongful, culpable act of the state then caused harm to a
victim such as Ms F, there is no reason why she should not be able to hold
the Minister directly liable.
The question whether the state had taken reasonable steps to prevent
harm also ties in with the risk theory in connection with state liability.
According to Wiechers, the legal basis for holding the state liable for the
actions of its employees lies in the risk theory, which postulates that if an
employer empowers his employees to perform certain functions, he
must bear the risk that those employees may cause damage to
individuals.179 In addition, the state’s mandate is to serve the citizens of
South Africa in accordance with the Constitution. One need only look at
the principles of Batho Pele180 to realise that the idea of service is central
to the government’s functions. Therefore, a government body has the
duty not to infringe any of the human rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights and sometimes, in the case of an omission, there may even be a
duty on the state to take positive steps to protect these rights.181 By
employing unsuitable individuals such as Van Wyk, the state runs the risk
of being held liable, not only on the basis of vicarious liability, but on the
basis of being directly to blame for their culpable failures. 
Of course, when litigating on the basis of direct liability, fault on behalf
of the government body should be proven and this may prove tricky in
some instances. However, this should not be an obstacle for a victim in
employing direct liability. In addition, there should also not be policy
considerations prohibiting a litigant from proceeding on the basis of
direct liability. One such objection could possibly be that it would open
the proverbial flood gates and that government’s coffers would soon be
emptied because of a multitude of lawsuits. This is a legitimate concern.
After all, as Scott so aptly states, it seems as though we are experiencing
an all-time low in the quality of normal policing functions as policemen
commit serious crimes almost on a daily basis; fire arms are being stolen
and sold en masse; service pistols are used in countless incidents of
domestic violence; and the former chief of the South African Police
Service and Interpol was even found guilty of corruption.182 However, it
179 Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) page number as quoted by Olivier
“Delictual liability of the South African Revenue Service: The wrongfulness
element” 2009 TSAR 740 744. 
180 Batho Pele means “people first” and these principles are access, which
means to offer integrated service delivery, openness and transparency,
which means to create a culture of collaboration, consultation, which means
to listen to the customer’s problems, redress, which means to apologise
when necessary. In addition there are the principles of courtesy, service
standards, information and value for money. See http://www.info.gov.za
(accessed on 2012-03-21).
181 Carmichele par 1
182 Scott 2011 TSAR 135 147. The writer states that all these factors would
explain why we are dealing with “near absolute liability” in cases
concerning the police.
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avoid that. 
5 Concluding Remarks
Life is duty – that is certain. There is no escaping the fact that the state
exists to serve the citizens of South Africa and to evade this duty
continuously and openly creates the risk of delictual liability. It is
submitted that the state as an employer can be held vicariously liable for
delicts of its employees or organs but, in addition, there is no reason why
direct liability should not be an option. With both causes of action, the
pure application of the principles of the law of delict will prevent unfair
results.
In practice, this proposal means that a plaintiff who sues the state has
the option of pleading the elements of vicarious liability and, in the
alternative, direct liability, or vice versa. The time has come to accept
that there is no basis for denying a plaintiff an action against the state
based on direct liability. With direct liability, the factual and normative
enquiry is evident in the test for wrongfulness, whereas the same factual
and normative enquiry takes place in establishing “course and scope of
employment” in vicarious liability.
It is submitted that Froneman J’s judgment paves the way for
recognising the possibility of direct liability and that the time is ripe for
employing that particular cause of action. Although this is not the
function of the law of delict, it may just be that a positive spin-off of direct
liability may be that it would serve as a deterrent for state organs and that
they would make a greater effort to take reasonable steps to ensure that
they perform their constitutional duties.
Grave concerns about the state of the police service are not
groundless. Typically, employers in general terms can only discipline or
take action against employees when their misconduct is within the work
context, except where the employer can prove that the off-duty
misconduct impacts on its business. As pointed out by Neethling, the
right to control is not only applicable when a policeman is on duty but
can also be extended to situations when they are on standby-duty or
even when they are off-duty and then place themselves on duty and
commit a delict. It is submitted that Neethling is correct: the creation of
risk approach should be considered in all instances of intentional
wrongdoing by an employee and the general guideline should be that an
“employer should be liable for an (intentional) delict of his employee if
his appointment and work conditions enabled him to commit the delict
(and hence created a heightened risk of prejudice) in such a manner”.
This should thus compel employers (especially the state) to take active
steps to prevent employees working from them from causing harm to
others (and the public at large). If the state as an employer takes proper
steps in curbing such behaviour and dismiss employees who abuse their
  The past, present and future of vicarious liability in South Africa    253authority and trust, then instances such as F or K will not be the order of
the day. Accountability is ultimately the responsibility of the employer (in
this case the state) and the saying “I am not my brother’s keeper” will not
be applicable here because it already has been established in Feldman
that a master who uses servants creates risk of harm to others if the
servant is negligent, inefficient or untrustworthy.
